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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
THE PSYCHIATRIST'S ROLE IN DETERMINING
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMES: THE PUBLIC
ANXIETY AND AN INCREASING EXPERTISE
"The comrades of the wounded men, seeing the plight those two
were in, now began showering stones on Don Quixote, who
shielded himself as best he could with his buckler, although he
did not dare stir from the trough for fear of leaving his armor
unprotected. The landlord, meanwhile, kept calling to them to
stop, for he had told them that this was a madman who would
be sure to go free even though he killed them all." Cervantes, The
Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote De La Mancha, Ch. III
(1605).
I. INTRODUCTION
In conjunction with the criminal law, the psychiatrist witness has
been asked to evaluate people at four different stages. He has been
asked to give his opinion whether the defendant understands the charges
and is able to aid his defense, whether the defendant should be held re-
sponsible for his activity, to recommend a disposition and finally to
recommend a stay for execution of sentence.' This comment will discuss
the second of these functions, the role of the psychiatrist in determining
whether someone should be held accountable for the consequences of his
acts who has accomplished activity classified by society as criminal. This
comment will discuss the legal tests for insanity only peripherally, by
illustrating the legal semantical difficulty produced by the attempts of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to deal with this problem.
The legal tests have been so overtreated and overemphasized that one
noted authority has remarked: "Rivers of ink, mountains of printer's
lead, foresets of paper have been expended on this issue, which is surely
marginal to the chaotic problem of effective, rational, and humane pre-
vention and treatment of crime."2
II. COMMUNICATION
There are three levels of what may be broadly called communication.3
On the first level are experts talking to fellow experts, a psychiatrist to
a psychiatrist. The second level of communication is the expert "[T] alk-
ing to people who are not members of an expert circle, but are equipped
with general background of common interest and previous informa-
tion."'4 An example of this level is the psychiatrist speaking to a group
I Sardoff, Mental Illness and the Criminal Process: The Role of the Psychiatrist,
54 A.B.A.J. 566 (1968) ; see also Wis. STATS. §§ 957.11 and 957.13 (1967) and
In re Hogan, 232 Wis. 521, 287 N.W. 725 (1939) ; see Hotz, The Burden of
Proof of Insanity as a Defense in Arkansas, 20 ARK. L. REv. 121 (1966).
2 Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, S. CAL. L. REv. 514, 516
(1968). Morris apolegetically admits being a prolific to this marginal problem.
See, e.g., Insanity and Automatism in N. MORRIS & C. HOWARD, STUDIES IN
CRIMINAL LAW 37 (1964).
3 Wolfenden, in THE LANGUAGES OF SCIENCE 24-6 (1963).
4 Id. at 24.
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of general medical practitioners. The third level of communication, the
concern of this comment, is that level at which the expert talks to the
ordinary man. This is the psychiatrist talking to the juror and to the
judge. "[I]n real life the vast majority of communications are at the
third and lowest level .... -5
In order for there to be a communication there must first exist four
requirements:
(1) a coding device;
(2) a transmitter;
(3) a receiver;
(4) a decoding device.6
This comment is concerned with coding and decoding. Wigmore once
used similar terminology in explaining testimonial evidence.7 He held
that there were three mental elements present in a witness' statement.
First, the witness must have received sense-impressions, i.e.
must have observed the affray, or otherwise received some im-
pressions on the question ... ; to this element may be given the
term Perception.
Secondly, the witness must have a recollection of these im-
pressions, the result of his Perception; this may be termed Recol-
lection, or Memory.
Thirdly, he must communicate this recollection to the tribunal;
that is, there must be Communication, or Narration, or Relation
(for there is no single term entirely appropriate).8
The third element, Transmission, specifically of psychiatric witness
opinions to the jury (the third level), will be examined in this comment.
The inadequacy of language as a medium is well known.9 Wigmore ex-
plained the coding-decoding difficulty by remarking that the inadequacy
of language has two aspects:
[ 1 ] The witness, by his mental equipment and condition may not
be able to choose the words that exactly express his thought, and
[2] the hearer, not being acquainted with the witness' personality
[i.e., his experience], may not receive the words in the same
sense.'
10
What code does the psychiatrist use? Is the jury able to decode the
psychiatric communication? The object of this communication of psy-
chiatrist to the jury, this coding-decoding, is the "perception and cate-
Id. at 25.
C Gray, The Language of Animals in THE LANGUAGES OF SCIENCE 96-7 (1963);
see also Stanton, Psychological Factors Influential in Jury Trials, 1963 FEDER-
ATION INS. COUNSEL J. 91.
7WIGxoR, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 171 (3d ed. 1937).
8 Id. at 308.
0 Id. § 262 at 569.
10 Id.
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gorization" of human beings, e.g., the alleged accused criminals. Should
or should not these men be held responsible for their crimes?
III. PSYCHIATRIc THINKING
Science is a "method of observation, experiment and hypothesis."'"
Unlike the law it recognizes no authority. Newton was wrong, Einstein
explained. Einstein too may have been wrong. Science claims to prove
nothing. It can only disprove."3 Nevertheless science is clearly distin-
guishable from other human methods of study in that the scientist is
constantly testing and recording the results of his tests. Furthermore,
although all men classify all things (Don Hutson was a "great" end
whereas Carroll Dale is a "good" end), "the scientist is a classifying
animal par excellence."' 4
The scientist's classification differs from the non-scientist's in
that the controls he imposes upon his perception result in obser-
vations with greater degrees of precision, validity, reliability, ob-
jectivity, and predictability .... Through classification, a scientist
attempts to organize the data associated with a phenomenon in
order to abstract from it regular or recurrent patterns. 5
The psychiatrist, like his fellow scientific cohorts, is a classifying ani-
mal. These classifications or labels, e.g., psychotic, are familiar and used
"by virtually every discipline from anthropology and the arts through
zoology."'1 They comprise "a modern linkuia artis universalis."1" The
psychiatrist views man's personality and body as an indivisible whole
and foresees "a growing integration of the biological, psycho-dynamic,
and sociological approaches and the emergence of a comprehensive psy-
chiatry ... -"' Psychiatry is still a fluid, changing and, one might even
say, perhaps paradoxically, uncertain science.' 9
Unlike many other scientists, the psychiatrist has difficulty quantify-
ing his observations. He studies the mind, but he perceives only what
derives from the mind-speech and action. Therefore, only in very,
very few cases will there be tangible evidence of a biological difficulty
(e.g., a brain injury) to show to the jury. There will be no presentation
of "the thing itself" to accompany the testimonial evidence, no "autoptic
proference," as Wigmore put it.20 The psychiatrist cannot show to the
"McKenna, A Rationale For Typologies of Criminal Behavior, 40 TEMP. L.Q.
316-17 (1967).
1Z Wolfenden, supra note 3, at 32.
13 Bondi, Why Scientists Talk in THE LANGUAGES OF SCIENCE 36 (1963).
14 McKenna, supra note 11, at 317.
15 Id.
16 Heller, Toward a Common Language for Behavioral Science and Law: The
Legal Utility of Psychiatric Labels and the Psychoanalytic Frame of Refer-
ence, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 283, 304 (1967).
17 Id.
18 ALEXANDER & SELESNICK, THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY 495 (1966).
19 Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness: Some Rumina-
tions and Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REv., 1335 (1965).
20 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 24, at 397 (3d ed. 1940).
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jury what he himself cannot perceive. In the ordinary case he relies on
"clinical judgment."21 This clinical judgment is based on psychiatric
examination.2 2 The history of the patient, his schooling, work, social
activities, familial and other relationships, and family illnesses are all
reviewed. The psychiatrist carefully analyzes the appearance of the pa-
tient, his awareness, his spatial and time orientation, his memory, his
mood and his thought content. This is a vast oversimplification, because
each of these words (e.g., "mood") is a story in itself. He also will
have made a physical examination and perhaps also a neurological ex-
amination in addition to the well-known psychological tests.23 The psy-
chiatrist, despite his "struggling with relatively crude techniques for the
scientific measurement of emotional differences," can brag that he is the
inheritor "of sixty modern years of careful, clinical obsercation of men-
tally ill persons. '24
But his clinical judgment, unlike the judgment of most scientists, is
based on behavioral evidence and "is an opinion about socioethical nor-
mality of conduct."25 In a broad sense, other branches of medicine can-
not define findings quantitatively,26 but "Psychiatry has less capacitties
for quantitation today than the other branches of medicine."27 Today,
the lowest possible common denominator of the results of its experi-
mental methodology is a qualitative explanation. 28 There is a difference
in kind, not degree, between the testimony of an orthopedic surgeon in
a personal injury suit and of a psychiatrist in a criminal trial.29 The
difference is that the orthopedic surgeon merely supplies certain rela-
tively specific information ("derived both from his direct observation
of the plaintiff and from his fund of general professional knowledge
about the human body" 30 ) whereas:
21 Alexander & Szasz, Mental Illness As An Excuse for Civil Wrongs, 43 Noim
DAME LAW. 24, 27 (1967).2 2 This very brief explanation of a psychiatric examination was drawn from an
address by Dr. Thomas Currier, Assistant Head of Mental Health for Mil-
waukee County, Criminal Law I Class, Marquette University, October 6, 1967.
23 Morse, The Aberrational Man: A Collection of Medical and Legal Treatments
of the Abnormal Mind: A Totr De Force of Legal Psychiatry, 42 TUL. L. IEv.
67, 129-54 (1967).24 Heller, supra note 16 at 284. See also ALEXANDER & SELESNICK, supra note 18
at 496:
There is even a movement to cast aside some sixty years of knowledge
and ideas amassed through the Freudian approach. It must be for psy-
chiatry to retain its sense of proportion, to recognize that although the
Freudian approach has its limitations, it would be absurd not to make
use of the great work that has grown out of Freud's legacy.
25 Alexander & Szasz, supra note 21, at 27.
26 Dr. Lawrence C. Kolb (Director, New York State Psychiatric Institute), In-
sanity As a Defense, a Panel Discussion, 37 F.R.D. 365, 405 (1964).
27 Id.
28 Cf. Kaufman, Insanity As a Defense, a Panel Discussion, 37 F.R.D. 365, 394
(1964), where the Judge said: "The difficulty that I see with this entire area is
that we're trying to draw a sharp line and a sharp line for psychiatrists as well
but all they have in hand is a paint brush."
29 Diamond & Louisell, supra note 19, at 1335.
30 Id. at 1336.
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With few exceptions, such as the electro-encephalogram, noth-
ing is observed, described, or measured except derivatives of the
mental processes. In order to make deductions and inferences
about the mind-both its normal and pathological functions-the
observer must have a theoretical framework in which to order,
explain, and interpret his observations of the mental derivatives.
Further, his inferences, as well as his observations, are strongly
colored by the qualities of his observing instrument; that is, his
own personality, experience, and theoretical training.3 1
The psychiatrist takes what he learns through his clinical observa-
tions and communicates it in a code of labels. He places this system
before us, not in the hope that it is exact or that it will ever quantify,
but rather that it "offers more information and better comprehension
of the human behavior" 32 than any other system presently can. Psychia-
try does not claim to be mathematical.
IV. LEGAL CONCEPTS AND LABELS
One problem of the psychiatrist appears to be that although he.is an
expert, he is forced to communicate in a code, with which he is not
familiar, to a group of non-experts (the third level of communication)
who understand neither his code nor the code imposed upon him. The
law seems to be waiting around for psychiatry to become more exact
and usable. The Fourth Circuit, which recently adopted the American
Law Institute Rule on insanity33 (which the adopting courts clearly be-
31 Id. at 1341.
32 Id. at 1342.
33 There is a trend toward the rule of the American Law Institute (the A.L.I.
Rule):
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial ca-
pacity to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.01, Comment at 66 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
This trend is developing the characteristics of a rout at the federal level where
it has been adopted by seven circuits since 1961. United States v. Freeman, 357
F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966) ; United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 775 (3d
Cir. 1961) (cognitive elements omitted) ; United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d
920 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Dusky v. United States,
295 F.2d 743, 759 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 998 (1962) ; Feuger
v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 245 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872
(1962); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Wion v. United
States, 352 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963). By judicial fiat it is the rule in
Kentucky, Massachusetts and Wisconsin (alternatively). Terry v. Common-
wealth, 371 S.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Ky. 1963) ; Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352
Mass. 544, 226 N.E. 556 (1967) ; State v. Schoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.V.
2d 458 (1966). The A.L.I. Rule is the law by statute in Illinois, Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, New York and Vermont. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 9(a) (Supp. 1968); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 552.030 (Supp. 1968) (omits substantial capacity qualification);
MONT. REV. CODs ANN. §95-501 (1968); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney
Supp. 1968) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 480 (Supp. 1968).
As a practical matter there is no difference in effect between those juris-
dictions which still retain the M'Naghten Rule supplemented by the Irresistable
Impulse Rule and those which are using the newer A.L.I. Rule. Here is a
modern restatement of the M'Naghten Rule:
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lieve is more psychiatric), indicated that this rule was a mere stopgap
which it had to use until "penology, psychiatry, and psychology become
more advanced." It need hardly be said that many people simply do
not trust psychiatrists with anything so obviously serious as the deter-
mination of criminal responsibility.3 5 Although this mistrust exists,
there seems to be an admission by the judiciary (it is they who have,
for the most part, formulated the tests) that the best rule is something
modern, something scientific, approaching psychiatry, but without giv-
ing the psychiatrist too much power.
This conflict between the psychiatrist's desired aid and fear of
his power is manifested as a battle of labels. Which code should we
use? The development of the Durham Rule is illustrative.36 The Durham
An accused must have had at the time of the commission of the criminal
act:(1) Such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of
the criminal act, or(2) If he did know, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong. State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521, 525 (1965).
At least half of the states also have some leaning in the direction of the
Irresistible Impulse Rule. State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521, 527
(1965) ("uncontrollable impulse") ; 26 Am. JUR. 2d Criminal Law §35, at 120-22
(1965). As with the M'Naghten Rule the exact statement of the Irresistible
Impulse Rule varies slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This test is
merely a gloss, or addition, to the M'Naghten Rule. No jurisdiction relies
solely on it. It can be argued that the first part of the A.L.I. Rule ("lacks
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct") is equiva-
lent to the second part of the M'Naghten' Rule ("If he did know, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong") and that the last part of the A.L.I.
Rule ("or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law") is simply
a variant of the Irresistible Impulse Rule. See, e.g., State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz.
200, 403 P.2d 521, 526 (1965).
The main semantic source of rebuttal for the A.L.I. courts is the word
"substantial." It is said that the M'Naghten Rule as supplemented by the Irre-
sistible Impulse Rule does not recognize degrees of incapacity. State v. Schoff-
ner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 437, 143 N.W.2d 458, 470 (1966). The Seventh Circuit
Court has said that the Irresistible Impulse Rule "requires complete destruction
of power of self-control where A.L.I. requires only that the defendant have
less than 'substantial capacity' to conform his conduct." United States v. Sha-
piro, 383 F.2d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 1967). The M'Naghten courts have, it would
seem, effectively answered this theoretical argument by saying that such a
subtle discrimination would not be likely to control the average juror's decision.
See, e.g., Pierce v. Turner, 276 F. Supp. 289, 295 (Utah 1967).
34 United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1968).
The ideal solution, perhaps, would be to exclude the question of crim-
inal responsibility from the trial, leaving to penologists the answers to
the question of criminal responsibility, with leave to record the court's
commitment as criminal or civil depending upon the answer to that
question, and to the questions of the kind and duration of the custodial
care and treatment he receives. Such an arrangement would afford an
opportunity for the answers to come after the development of much
fuller, more reliable record upon more thorough psychiatric and psy-
chological testing. Id.
See also the words of Mr. Justice Marshall about "the undeveloped state of
the the psychiatric art," in connection with "free will" to resist alcohol. Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 526 (1968).
35 Szasz, The Insanity Plea and the Insanity Verdict, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 271, 281-82(1967). Note, Madness In the Crintinal Law, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 348, 354 (1967).
36 The Durham Rule is adhered to in only three jurisdictions, the District of
Columbia, New Hampshire and Maine. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870) ; State v. Jones,
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Rule, a reshaped version of an earlier New Hampshire test, read: "[A] n
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease or defect. ' 37 The reasons for the adoption of the rule
are not important any longer. What is important is that the court, even
as it chose the new definition, was forced to define words within that
definition. The Durham Rule, because it has had a much shorter history
than its predecessors, is an outstanding example of the law's attempt
to duplicate the work of another discipline, namely, psychiatry, through
the law's quite unscientific case method. The court in Durham distin-
guished the words "disease" and "defect":
We use disease in the sense of a condition which is considered
capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use "defect"
in the sense of a condition which is [1 ] not considered capable of
either improving or deteriorating, or [2] the result of injury, or
[3] the residual effect of a physical or mental disease.38
It was inevitable that these words would prove to be troublesome. The
court in effect picked them out of the air, preferring an almost forgotten
New Hampshire legal precedent to fifty years of modern psychiatric
labeling. In Blocker v. United States39 a doctor testified at a first degree
murder trial that a sociopathic personality disturbance was not a mental
disease or defect. Less than one month after the verdict, a doctor from
the same hospital staff testified to the opposite. The court granted a new
trial.
Even though the Durham rule has only a few words, another label
in it has also been attacked. What does the word "product" mean? A
dissenting judge in Blocker attacked this term and in doing so pointed
out the root problem behind the more superficial problem of labels. He
said that the term was inadequate because it was used in a quasi-medical
sense and thereby allowed the experts to go too far in expressing con-
clusions as to the causal link between the disease and the criminal act
charged.4 0 The court was being quasi-medical.
The court came to realize that because the definition looked quasi-
medical, the psychiatrist had begun to treat it as medical invitation and
that since psychiatry has no classification of persons termed "mentally
ill," that the psychiatrist was simply, "perhaps unwittingly," injecting
his "own notions about blame to determine whether the term mental ill-
ness should" include, for example, "all mental abnormalities."' The
court was forced, in McDonald v. United States,4 2 to add to the code
50 N.H. 389 (1871); ME. Riv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 102 (1964). Its importance
nationally lies primarily in the lessons which can be learned from the diffi-
culties encountered in the development of the rule.
37 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (1954).
38 Id. at 875.
39 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
40 Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
41 Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
42312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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that it was developing and imposing on the psychiatrist. The court
stated:
[N] either the court nor the jury is bound by ad hoc definitions
or conclusions as to what experts state is a disease or defect.
What psychiatrists may consider a "mental disease or defect" for
clinical purposes, where their concern is treatment, may or may
not be the same as mental disease or defect for the jury's purpose
in determining criminal responsibility. Consequently, for that
purpose the jury should be told that a mental disease or defect
includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially
affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs
behavior controls. Thus the jury would consider testimony con-
cerning the development, adaptation and functioning of these pro-
cesses and controls.
We emphasize that since the question of whether the defendant
has a disease or defect is ultimately for the triers of fact, obviously
its resolution cannot be controlled by expert opinion. The jury
must determine whether the nature and degree of the disability,
are sufficient to establish a mental disease or defect as we have
now defined those terms. What we have said, however, should in
no way be construed to limit the latitude of expert testimony.4 3
The court was reasserting, inter ali, the primacy of its still-developing
code over the well-developed and readily usable code of the psychiatrist.
In this sense it can be said that the court not only dabbled in semantics,
but also reduced the power of the psychiatrist by rejecting his system of
labels.
There are actually two separate types of label problems in the Dur-
ham series: (1) The psychiatrist sometimes has used his own code
(e.g., schizophrenia, neurosis) without sufficient explanation; (2) The
psychiatrist has used the actual terms of the definition (e.g., "product"
and "mental disease or defect"). In other words, not only does the psy-
chiatrist have a tendency to use his own code, but to misuse the legal
code. This was recognized in the latest important case of this series,
Washington v. United States.:4 The court required that as to the first
problem, "[T]he trial judge should ensure that their meaning [i.e., the
43Id. at 851. This, of course, is not merely a question of semantics, but is also
tied up with the whole problem of insufficient pleading in criminal trials; see
Note, 51 MAARQ. L. REv. 104, 112 (1967).
44 390 F.2d 444, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Another important case in this series is
Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where the court
said, prior to the McDonald case:
Unexplained medical labels-schizophrenia, paranoia, psychosis, neurosis,
psychopathy-are not enough. Description and explanation of the origin,
development and manifestations of the alleged disease are the chief
functions of the expert witness. The chief value of an experes testi-
mony in this field, as in all other fields, rests upon the material from
which his opinion is fashioned and the reasoning by which he pro-
gresses from his material to his conclusion; in the explanation of the
disease and its dynamics, that is, how it occurred, developed, and affected
the mental and emotional processes of the defendant; it does not lie in
his mere expression of conclusion.
19691
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labels of the psychiatric code] is explained to the jury and, as much as
possible, that they are explained in a way which relates their meaning to
the defendant."' 5 As to the second issue, the court continued, at least
temporarily, not to prohibit testimony on "mental disease or defect," but
had a different view on the label, "product" :46
The term "product" has no clinical significance for psychiatrists.
Thus, there is no justification for permitting psychiatrists to testi-
fy on the ultimate issue. Psychiatrists should explain how de-
fendant's disease or defect relates to his alleged offense; that is,
how the development, adaptation and functioning of defendant's
behavioral processes may have influenced his conduct. But psy-
chiatrists should not speak directly in terms of "product," or even
"result" or "cause.1 47
To further clarify the scope of psychiatric testimony to the expert and
the jury, the court wrote an 850-word letter of instructions which it
ordered sent to the psychiatrist at the time he is required to examine a
defendant and, also, ordered it read to the jury in open court as soon
as the first psychiatric witness qualified as an expert. This labeling diffi-
culty is common to all of the tests, because all tests are "proposed sub-
stitutes" for the science of psychiatry.48
The reason for these proposals, while actually a mistrust of psychia-
try, is often explained by saying that the aims or goals of the criminal
law and psychiatry are so dissimilar that a legal code must be devel-
oped.4 9 The standard goals of the criminal law, (1) retribution, (2)
deterrence of antisocial acts by the criminal, (3) deterrence of such
acts by others, and (4) general security, have been adequately discussed
elsewhere.50 These goals are often spoken of in terms of social control
-1 390 F.2d 444, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
46Id. at 456.
47 Id. For the use of limiting instructions to prevent other dangers of possible
jury confusion and prejudice, see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 369 (1964) (con-
fession case involving possible confusion in simultaneous determination of
questions of voluntariness and truthfulness). Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554
(1967) (possible prejudicial effect on guilt determination by evidence relevant
to a since modified habitual offender statute); Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d
278, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967) (possible prejudicial effect on guilt determination
of evidence of prior occurrences introduced to impeach credibility) ; see Note,
51 M\IARQ. L. REv, 104 (1967); See also Wells v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 724, 162
N.W.2d 634 (1968) (district attorney commenting on prior crimes at voir dire;
waives).
48 See the remarks of Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
Insanity As a Defense, a Panel Discussion, 37 F.R.D. 365, 370 (1964). The
Durham series is easier to criticize because it is short and confined to one
jurisdiction.
4 Shindell, The Public and the Criminal: Observations on the Tail of the Curve,
50 A.B.A.J. 545, 548 (1964).
Since the vast majority of the people, moreover, have no confidence that
psychiatrists can either (1) determine with accuracy when a person
should be excused from punishment, or (2) adequately apply therapy
to prevent a recurrence of asocial behavior, there has grown up in the
law a series of "tests" for insanity which have little to do with the
realities of even present psychiatric knowledge.
30 Note, supra note 35, at 358.
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based on general policy decisions. 51 It is becoming clear, however, that
there is a common "interface" between psychiatry and the law. 2 Some
have gone so far as to say that the role of these two disciplines is gen-
erically the same: "Both psychiatry and law are concerned with defining
which roles are socially legitimate and which are not, and with enforcing
conformity to prescribed roles. 15 3 Others with more exactitude point out
that psychiatry is a broader discipline, but that there is significant con-
tact :
This interface [between law, psychiatry and society] relates to
the fact that within a given society, law attempts to control spe-
cific kinds of behavior by a system of sanctions [e.g., custody,
punishment, and detention], while psychiatry seeks to develop a
general understanding of human behavior and improved methods
of treating mental illness.54
The difference in emphasis between the criminal law and psychiatry has
been imposed by society. Also, differences in terminology, or code as
this comment posits, do not necessarily imply fundamental differences
in social control and in goals, or even in effect on the accused individual,
but simply that different lines of study have developed on the same
topic. 55
V. THE JURY: ITS FEARS AND ABILITIES.
THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EDUCATIVE PANEL
We have thus far examined the code of the psychiatrist and the
code of the law (by an exemplar, the Durham-McDonald rule). It will
now be necessary to deal somewhat with the recodification ability of
the jury. The psychiatrist testifies using the legal code, but slipping
into his own code whenever he is allowed. How does the jury react to
these communications? Is a solution, or rather a betterment, possible
within the present legal context?
No one asserts that the jury system for the determination of crim-
inal responsibility is perfect. Advocates of the use of the jury to deter-
mine the issue simply believe that the "judgment of the community" is
the best tool to use because "total human behavior is not an exact sci-
ence and cannot presently be completely understood and explained."5 6
51 See, e.g., Cooper, Toward a Rational Doctrine of Criminal Responsibility, 59
J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 338, 345 (1968).
52 Heller, supra note 16, at 284; Law, Morals, and Medicine: A Method of Ap-
proach to Current Problems, 13 J. FOR. Sci. 318, 331 (1968).
53 Szasz, supra note 35, at 275.
" Heller, supra note 16, at 284.
5-5 Alexander & Szasz, supra note 21, at 33. When the psychiatrist speaks of "mis-
takes ... in interpreting reality and reacting to it" it doesn't necessarily imply,
from what may appear to the layman to be euphemistic phraseology for mur-
der and rape, that the psychiatrist will be "softer" on what the layman calls
"murderers" and "rapists."
58 Spurlock v. State, 212 Tenn. 132, 368 S.W.2d 299, 302 (1963). An interesting
parallel can be drawn between psychiatric testimony given on the issue of
criminal responsibility and testimony as to whether a confession is testimoni-
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It is not possible to meet the inexact science argument except to say that
exactness should not be the sole criterion. Psychiatry, it would seem,
has much more to tell us about human behavior than the jury does.5 7
While it may be impossible empirically to rebut the exactness argument,
it may be possible to show that there are weaknesses in what advocates
of jury use in this area call common sense. Professor Jerome Hall, one
of these advocates, has admitted that psychiatrists obviously know more
about mental disease than juries, but that he prefers the "common sense
psychology of intelligent laymen," even while conceding that modem
psychiatry has added to this common sense.58
An experiment was conducted recently by a sociologist from the
University of Illinois 59 in which 1,176 jurors from jury pools in three
large cities listened to recorded trials. The variants in the trials were
the legal tests and the type of testimony. It was discovered that 12 per-
cent more jurors voted for acquittal under the Durham Rule than under
M'Naghten.6° More important, changes in the quality and extent of ex-
pert testimony had no effect on the results.6 The facts are that the jury
(1) does not understand the code of the psychiatrist, (2) does -not un-
derstand the legal framework, and (3) applies its own reasoning to the
case to the extent of regarding its own fears as more important than the
elaborate judicial system. 62 In other words, the layman, the juror, puts
his own "value" on the asocial behavior. 63
Dr. Sidney Shindell has analyzed jury behavior in terms of whether
the juror is able to identify with the victim or whether the juror fears
the victim because of possible injury to things and concepts which the
ally trustworthy. See State v. La Pean, 247 Wis. 302, 313, 19 N.W.2d 289, 293,
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 801 (1945), citing what is now 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law
§ 817(2) at 167 (1961):
Whether a confession is . . . testimonially trustworthy depends largely
upon the facts of the particular case. In determining this question, fac-
tors which are proper to be considered include the sex, age, character,
disposition, education, and previous training of accused, his mental qual-
ities, his physical health, and his surroundings, as well as the nature,
content, and import of the confession itself.
57Diamond & Louisell, supra note 19, at 1342.
58 HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 460-66 (2d ed. 1960).
The psychiatrists' work does not call upon them to decide whether their
patients should or could have acted differently than they did, whether,
i.e. they had the capacity to conform. But it is precisely this question
which does make sense in everyday life; and it is the central issue in
the trial.
In other words, Hall believes that the psychiatrist, it would seem, is not really
an expert at all in the determination of criminal responsibility, but rather
merely an eccentric data collector for the jury.
59 SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967).
60 Id. at 216.
61 Id. at 217.
62 112 CoNG. REc. 2975 (1966) (remarks of Senator Dodd). This address contains
statistics, from St. Elizabeth's Hospital of the District of Columbia covering
1954 to 1961, which place the Durham. Rule in a good light.
63 Shindell, supra note 49.
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juror values.6 His view is that the present general structure, as inaccu-
rate as it may be, must be retained and improved because it meets the
anxieties of the public. It reassures the public. The public, as represented
by the jury, must deal with the public problem.
It is possible to maintain the participation of the public through the
use of the jury and still bring the psychiatric, scientific accuracy of the
twentieth century into the courtroom. Both concepts could be served if
a panel of psychiatrists would, before voir dire, in effect explain modem
psychiatry to prospective jurors. This panel would present what could
be called "instructions" to the laymen. The laymen would be educated
about the integrated personality, the id, the psychotic, methods of clin-
ical psychiatry, and other related matters, before they knew what type of
cases they would hear. The panel would serve an instructive, educative
function in this limited area. Since it would not be called by either side,
there could be no challenges of immateriality and prejudice. One objec-
tion to such a panel might be expense. This objection comes up every
time a new courtroom or judgeship is proposed and can only be an-
swered by saying that justice is priceless and that there are few if any
social instruments which should be as well subsidized as the judicial sys-
tem. Another objection would be the possibility of debate about what
actually to tell the prospective jurors. Perhaps the American Medical
Association, or some similar organization, could establish a pattern of
instructions and standards for this panel. The composition of the panel
and the selection of disciplines to be represented might also be the sub-
ject of debate and might be even more difficult to solve.65
One of the great virtues of such a panel would be that the entire
meaning of psychiatry (in capsule form) could be told in an organized
fashion at one time, separate from the normal guilt determination so
sacred to the law. Increased narration by psychiatric witnesses during
trial should also be advocated, but it cannot be an effective substitute
for the panel because the testifying psychiatrist cannot put the accused's
conduct and personality in context without presenting a choppy and
incomplete view of psychiatry as a whole. It is of little value to tell a
layman that the defendant is psychotic if the layman does not know the
64 d. Dr. Shindell in a discussion with the writer classified these anxieties as
of three types: (1) Dissolution of society (e.g., treason). (2) Bodily harm(e.g., kidnapping). (3) Honor (e.g., rape and, interestingly, also fear of loss
of property, a source of self-image). In addition to fear there are other
important determinatives of the decision of the jury. See Staton, Psychological
Factors Influential in Jury Trials, 1963 FEDERATION INS. COUNSEL J. 91, 108,
where the author discusses randomly selected topics to illustrate unconscious
psychological mechanisms influential in determining how people act. The fol-
lowing are there discussed (1) concepts, (2) emotions, (3) identification, (4)
rationalization, and (5) emotional generalization; see also Prosser, Book Re-
view, 43 CALF. L. REv. 556, 558 (1955).
65 GLEUcK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 152 (1962); see also Wis. STATS. § 957.27
(1967). See FLESCH, THE ART OF PLAIN TALK 164 (1951) (Can a science be
truly explained to a layman?).
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meaning of neurotic. Some medical experts have the relatively easy task
of explaining to us how one bone in our body functions, but the psy-
chiatrist's task, that of explaining human behavior, is much more com-
prehensive and difficult. It would surely simplify his task if he had only
to tell us of the behavior of one man, knowing that human behavior in
general has already been expounded on by an impartial panel. It must
be acknowledged that, just as with the present system of legal tests,
such a panel would provide a substitute standard for the community
standard based on common experience and logic. This substitute stand-
ard would be based on logic but also on experience derived from learned
specialized study. As with all expertise, it would also be based somewhat
on hearsay. Dr. X would in part base his testimony (or in this case, a
member of the educative panel would base his instruction) on the books
he had read written by Dr. Z. Such a panel, however, would expand the
role of the psychiatrist and the jury and would still meet the problem
of public anxiety by allowing the public as the jury decide the issue.
VI. OTHER POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
There are other possible solutions to the general problem of how to
accurately determine who should be held criminally accountable. These
solutions are all proposed by men who have faith in psychiatry as a
science. Under the present system, to somewhat oversimplify, the jury
determines two issues: (1) The fact. Did the defendant commit the act?
What were the consequences of the act? (2) Why? Should the defend-
ant be held criminally responsible? What was his intent?
Some states have instituted a system of bifurcated trials. The two
issues (fact and why) are dealt with separately by the same jury.66 A
66 State ex rel La Follette v. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 625, 150 N.W.2d 318, 327
(1967) ; California has a new statute implementing the bifurcation procedure.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1968):
Sentences of death or imprisonment for life; determination; minors
under 18
The guilt or innocence of every person charged with an offense for
which the penalty is in the alternative death or imprisonment for life
shall first be determined, without a finding as to penalty. If such person
has been found guilty of an offense punishable by his life imprisonment
or death, and has been found sane on any plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity, there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of
penalty, and the trier of fact shall fix the penalty. Evidence may be pre-
sented at the further proceedings on the issue of penalty, of the circum-
stances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background and his-
tory, and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. The
determination of the penalty of life imprisonment or death shall be in
the discretion of the court or jury trying the issue of fact on the evi-
dence presented, and the penalty fixed shall be expressly stated in the
decision or verdict. The death penalty shall not be imposed, however,
upon any person who was under the age of 18 years at the time of the
commission of the crime. The burden of proof as to the age of said
person shall be upon the defendant.
If the defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a jury,
the trier of fact shall be the court. If the defendant was convicted by
a plea of guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived.
If the defendant was convicted by a jury, the trier of fact shall be the
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logical extension of bifurcation is to allow the jury to determine the fact
issue, a determination at which no one is clearly expert, and to relegate
the why question to someone with greater understanding of psychiatry.
The judge could determine this issue better than the jury, having had
contact with modern psychiatry and having clarified his thinking pro-
cesses by a long general education. 67 The question then becomes whether
the judge should use the legal tests for insanity or whether he should
use the code of the psychiatrist. 1
Instead of having the judge determine the issue of responsibility,
a panel of experts, as proposed by Sheldon Gleuck, could be established.69
He suggested that, for example, the panel be composed "[O]f a psychia-
trist, a psychologist, a sociologist or cultural anthropologist, an educa-
tor, and a judge with long experience in criminal trials and with a spe-
cial interest in the protection of the legal rights of those charged with
crime.170 Such a panel would be such a radical departure that it is not
at all startling also to propose and predict that if it were so composed,
it would not use the legal code, but rather the code of modern psychiatry.
It would have the advantages of impartiality and the vice of bureaucracy.
It would be bureaucratic in the sense that it would eliminate the ulti-
mate community judgment which the jury system retains in some de-
gree.
Because psychiatrists today, at least for the defense, work much
closer with the litigant than was once the case, they are becoming less
impartial than they once were and much less impartial than a panel,
chosen by neither side, could be. In addition to working more closely
with the litigant, the psychiatrist today works closer and longer with the
same jury unless, for good cause shown, the court discharges that jury
in which case a new jury shall be drawn to determine the issue of pen-
alty.
In any case in which the defendant has been found guilty by a jury,
and the same or another jury, trying the issue of penalty, is unable to
reach a unanimous verdict on the issue of penalty, the court shall dis-
miss the jury and either impose the punishment for life in lieu of order-
ing a new trial on the issue of penalty, or order a new jury impaneled
to try the issue of penalty, but the issue of guilt shall not be retried by
such jury.
67 See comments of Professor Wechsler, Insanity As a Defense, a Panel Discus-
sion, 37 F.R.D. 365, 411 (1964). He believes the judge should determine the
issue of criminal responsibility. He points out that the American Law Insti-
tute considered that there were insurmountable difficulties, constitutionally, in
such a solution. As an alternative he advocates the addition of a court ap-
pointed psychiatrist as an impartial appearing expert witness. Cf. Judge Biggs'
comments at 412.
68 Compare the comments of judge Hays, Insanity As a Defense, a Panel Dis-
cussion, 37 F.R.D. 365, 367 (1964) with comments of judge Biggs at 395.
69 GLEucK, supra note 65 at 152:
The primary duty of such a sentencing and treatment-guiding body
would be to determine the therapeutic plan appropriate to the individual
as a member of a class whose past responses to various forms of sen-
tence have been systematically investigated.
70Id.
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attorney.7 The establishment of such a panel would tend to bring the
psychiatrist in immediate contact with his world of objectivity and sci-
ence and relieve him of the burden of being a good witness. As to the
objection that such a panel would be beyond the control of the public
and would be dictatorial and all-powerful, it can only be said that we
already tolerate such dictatorship in our parole board procedures and
that perhaps the knowledge that experts are handling the problem will
be enough to meet the public anxiety once the panel has been allowed
to prove itself by a reasonable interval of operation.
7
1
VII. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the law needs the psychiatric language or code which
is common to so many other disciplines. But such a code is merely sym-
bolic of the greater need for the re-examination of the subjective aspects
of the juridical act. The code and, more importantly, the experience of
psychiatry should be utilized because it is already well developed and
accepted by many related disciplines. Such experience must either be
(1) taught to the jury (perhaps by a state-established panel of educators
at the pre-voir dire stage) or (2) the judgment of criminal responsi-
bility must be vested in experts rather than the jury. If the issue is taken
from the jury, it may either be assigned solely to a panel of experts or
it may be argued to the judge who is presumably much more familiar
with the psychiatric experience.
The judge could be allowed to treat insanity as a plea in bar, a plea
which goes to bar the prosecution's case, that is, to defeat it absolutely
and entirely. An analogous procedure was advocated by the Government
and Mr. Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States where it was ar-
gued that "[ T] he issue of entrapment is not triabue under the plea of not
guilty, but should be raised by plea in bar or be adjudicated in some
manner by the court rather than by the jury .... -73 This position was
again raised, and again rejected twenty-five years later in Sherman v.
United States.7 4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the result in the
Sherman case, agreed with Mr. Justice Roberts.7 5 Such a pre-trial mo-
tion and the use of modern commitment procedures (such as the pres-
ent Wisconsin statutory scheme), would have the admirable result of
eliminating inconsistent pleading.76 The person involved would no longer
have to say, "I am not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity," just
as Mr. Justice Roberts advocated that one should not have to argue,
"not guilty and not guilty by reason of entrapment."
71 Diamond & Louisell, supra note 19, at 1344.
72 Note, Experimentation on Human Behavior, 20 STAN. L. REv. 99 (1967).
73 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932).
74356 U.S. 369, 377 (1957).
75 Id. at 384-85.
76See Wis. STATS. Ch. 51 (1967) ; see also Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally
Ill in Wisconsin; A Need for a Reexamination, 51 MARQ. L. Rxv. 1, 4-10
(1967).
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This comment has shown that there are various possible alternatives
to the present method of determining criminal responsibility for crimes.
Of all the. alternatives, the possibility of the use of an educative panel to
inform the prospective jurors is perhaps the best accommodation of
the American trust in the jury system and modem psychiatry. Although
the A.L.I. Rule and the Durham Rule are splendid creations within the
context of our present legal system, it would seem that no legal test will
allow the greater individualization of justice for which the law should
strive, because mental disease is much too complex to "make it simple
and understandable to everyone just by inventing simple words or
phrases to describe it."' 77 The path of change to a better legal test and
consideration of mental illness is strewn with constitutional, emotional,
political, historical, and administrative difficulties; but an attempt to
provide something better, perhaps in the nature of an educative panel,
is overdue.
78
JAMES G. PouRos
77 112 CONG. RFc. 2975 (1966) (remarks of Senator Dodd).
7 8See Cardozo, What Medicine Can do for Law, in LAW AND LITERATURE AND
OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES (1931), for an eloquent prediction made in 1928
that ".... at a day not far remote the teachings of biochemists and behaviorists,
of psychiatrists and penologists, will transform our whole system of punish-
ment for crime." When? See Roberts v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 537, 164 N.W.2d
525 (1969), where it was held that a qualified psychologist may testify to his
opinion of the mental state of a person he has examined.
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